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Where to Draw the Line? The Supreme
Court Reverses on Federal Funding
Programs Regarding Religious Schools:
Agostini v. Felton
In Agostini v. Felton1 the Supreme Court reversed its 1985 decision
in Aguilar v. Felton2 by holding that a federally funded program
providing supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children
on a neutral basis is valid under the Establishment Clause' even when
the instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools by
government employees as long as the program contains safeguards such
as those present in New York City's Title I program.4 Thus, the twelveyear-old permanent injunction entered in Aguilar against New York
City's Title I program was vacated.5
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 19656 was
enacted to provide financial assistance, through the states, to local
educational agencies ("LEAs") serving areas with concentrations of
children from low income families. The purpose of Title I is to expand
and improve these LEAs' educational programs, particularly special
educational programs, by various means.7 Title I mandates that the
funds must be made available to all eligible children, not particular
schools or school systems, regardless of whether they attend public or
private schools! In effect, the children qualify for the aid not the school

1. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
2, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
3. U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...
4. 117 S.Ct. at 2016.
5. Id at 2019.
6. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Title I, 79 Stat. 27 (1965),
current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514 (Supp. 1998).
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990).
8. 117 S. Ct. at 2004 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6312(c)(1)(F)).
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or school system. However, even though the services provided to private
school children are to be equivalent to those given to public school
children,9 LEAs are subject to numerous constraints when providing
services to private school children as opposed to public school children."0 For example, in the private school context, no program services
are allowed on a school-wide basis, and only specifically eligible children
could be provided aid." Also, "Title I services themselves must be
'secular, neutral, and nonideological,'... and must 'supplement, and in
no case supplant, the level of services' already provided by the private
school." 2
With ten percent of the total eligible students enrolled in religious
private schools, the Board of Education of the City of New York ("the
Board"), an LEA, initially arranged to transport those children to public
schools to receive after-school Title I instruction. However, attendance
was poor, the teachers and children were tired, and parents were
concerned for their children's safety. Because this enterprise was largely
unsuccessful, the Board moved the after-school instruction onto private
school campuses as Congress had contemplated when it enacted Title I.
This after-school program continued to yield mixed results. Therefore,
the Board implemented a plan in which the instruction would be given
during school hours, still on the private school campuses. Essentially,
the plan called for public school teachers to provide the remedial
instruction to eligible students. Included in the plan were supervisors
and specific directions to ensure no involvement with religious activities
or materials in the classrooms during Title I instruction. A program
coordinator supervised the instruction, making unannounced visits to
monitor Title I classes in the private schools."3
In 1978 six taxpayers commenced an action, Aguilar v. Felton, in the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that the
Title I program administered by the City of New York violated the
Establishment Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to
the Board, and an unanimous Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed. 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a five to four

9. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6321(aX3)).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 6321(aX2) and 34 C.F.R. § 200.12(a) (1996)).
13. Id. at 2004-05.
14. Felton v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 72 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd sub
nom Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (holding that Meek v. Pittenger,421 U.S. 349 (1975),
controlled the instant case and that public funds can be used to afford remedial instruction
only if at a neutral site off the premises of a religious school).
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decision, affirmed the Second Circuit.1" The Court held that the
Board's program was constitutionally flawed because it necessitated an
excessive entanglement of church and state in the administration of Title
I services.'!
In October and December 1995, the Board and a group of parents of
parochial school students entitled to Title I services filed motions in the
district court under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("Rule 60(b)"). 1 7 In this new action, Agostini v. Felton, petitioners
sought relief from the permanent injunction entered on remand from the
decision of the Supreme Court in Aguilar. Petitioners argued that relief
was proper under Rule 60(b)(5) because the subsequent "decisional law
[had] changed to make legal what the [injunction] was designed to
prevent.""; The district court, while recognizing Rule 60(b)(5) as a
procedurally sound vehicle to get the propriety of the injunction before
the Supreme Court, denied the motion on the merits. Even though the
court observed that there might have been reason to conclude from
recent Establishment Clause decisions that Aguilar's demise was
imminent, that demise had not yet occurred. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed for substantially the same reasons stated in
the district court opinion.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed in another five to four decision, holding that "a federally funded
program providing supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged
children on a neutral basis is not invalid under the Establishment
Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian
schools by government employees pursuant to a program containing
safeguards such as those present" in petitioner's program."
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The 1947 opinion of the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of
Education" was used to fashion a test for considering whether a
program providing state or federal aid to children attending religious
22
schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
In Everson a New Jersey statute authorized reimbursement to parents
II.

15. 473 U.S. at 408, 414.
16. Id.
17. FED. R. CIrv. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b)(5) provides for relief from a judgment when "it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Id.
18. 117 S. Ct. at 2006.
19. Id
20. Id. at 2016.
21. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
22. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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for the costs incurred in bussing their children to Catholic parochial
schools on regular busses operated by the public transportation
system.' The Court noted the difficulty in drawing the line between
tax legislation that provided funds for the general welfare of the public
and that which was designed to support religious schools.24 The Court
upheld the statute, stating that a program that is neutral in its relations
with religious and nonreligious groups and that aims to benefit all of its
citizens without regard to their religious beliefs was not prohibited by
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.2" The Court
reasoned that even though tax dollars were used to help children get to
church schools, the statute was still neutral; the service was similar to
other general government services as ordinary as police and fire
protection, public highways, and sidewalks.2" When church schools
have the benefit of general government services, tax dollars make it
easier for parents to send their children to religious schools. 7 Conversely, cutting off these services would make it harder for the schools
to operate. 28 The Court stated that the Establishment Clause's purpose
was not to handicap religious institutions as compared to the general
public anymore than it was to favor any religious institution over the
general public.' The Court in School District u. Schempp used this
holding to fashion a test for evaluating statutes under the Establishment
Clause.' "[To withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion."3 1
The Court in Board of Education v. Allen12 used this test and upheld
a New York statute requiring school books to be loaned free of charge to
all students in specified grades, including those in sectarian schools."
The Court reasoned that the funds went to the children, not to the
schools." Even if the statute made it easier for parents to send their
children to sectarian schools, as in Everson, this consideration alone did

23.

330 U.S. at 3.

24. Id. at 14.
25. Id. at 19.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 17-18.
Id at 18.
Id.
Id.
374 U.S. at 222.
Id.
392 U.S. 236 (1968).
Id. at 248.
Id. at 244 n.6.
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not demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for religious
institutions.'"
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,"6 the Court developed a three-pronged test
from these earlier cases.37 The test required that the statute (1) have
a secular legislative purpose, (2) have as its principal or primary effect
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' This third prong
was added not from a case regarding religious schools, but from Walz v.
Tax Commission," in which the Court held property tax exemptions for
church-owned property as not violative of the Establishment Clause.' °
The Court in Lemon interpreted the holding in Walz to "confine rather
than enlarge the area of permissible state involvement with religious
institutions by calling for close scrutiny of the degree of entanglement
The Court defined the third prong's
involved in the relationship."
objective as limiting, as much as possible, the intrusion of either into the
precincts of the other.'2
In Lemon the Court struck down a Rhode Island statute that
supplemented parochial school teachers' salaries and a Pennsylvania
statute that reimbursed certain secular educational services provided by
parochial schools.' The Court concluded that the cumulative impact
of the entire relationship arising under the statute in each state involved
excessive entanglement between government and religion." The Court
in Lemon reasoned that because states must be certain that subsidized
teachers do not inculcate religion in their teaching, "comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing" state surveillance would be required."5
The Court held that "[tihese prophylactic contacts will involve excessive
and enduring entanglement between the state and church.'
The excessive entanglement prong continued to be dispositive when
considering aid to sectarian schools. In Meek v. Pittenger,7 the Court
upheld the textbook loan provisions but held unconstitutional the

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id at 244.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612.
Id at 612-13.
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Id. at 680.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
Id.
Id. at 615.
Id.

45.

Id. at 619.

46. Id
47. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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massive aid of a Pennsylvania statute.' Even though the aid was
secular and nonideological (charts, maps, and lab supplies), the Court
stated that when it flows in large amounts to an institution in which
religion is a substantial portion of its function, the state aid has the
impermissible effect of advancing religion.49 Also, the supplying'of
professional staff was found unconstitutional because of the comprehensive surveillance necessary to ensure that subsidized teachers did not
inculcate religion in their instruction.' These close contacts were held
as necessarily giving rise to a constitutionally intolerable entanglement
between church and state.6"
Following the same reasoning in Meek, the Court used the threepronged Lemon test in School District v. Ball 52 and Aguilar." Each
case involved remedial and enhancement programs in which publicly,
funded teachers provided services on private school campuses during
school hours."
Once again, the pervasive monitoring by public
authorities in the religious schools was held to infringe precisely upon
those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of
excessive entanglement. 55
However, two cases did pass muster under the Lemon test, allowing
public funds and public employees to assist students at religious
institutions. In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind," petitioner applied for, vocational rehabilitation services
pursuant to a Washington state statute authorizing funds for visually
impaired students. Petitioner was denied aid by the Washington
Commission for the Blind based on his attendance at a private Christian
college to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Using the
Lemon test, the Washington Supreme Court found that financial aid by
the state. enabling someone to become a pastor, missionary, or church
youth director clearly had the primary effect of advancing religion and
thus contravened the Establishment Clause. 7 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, also using the Lemon test, but holding that
because the provided aid flowed to religious institutions only as a result
of independent choices of aid recipients, the Establishment Clause was

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 365-66 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 370.

52.

473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985).

53. 473 U.S. at 412.
54. Id. at 408-09.

55. Id. at 412-13.
56. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
57.

Id. at 483-85.

1998]

AGOSTINI V. FELTON

883

not violated." The Court reasoned that under the statute, individuals,
not the state, decided to use the aid to support religious institutions and
likened this to a government employee donating part or all of a paycheck
to a religious institution. 9
Similarly, in Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School District," petitioners, a deaf child and his parents, were denied by respondent school
district a sign language interpreter at a religious high school requested
pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEAL). 6 '
The Supreme Court, applying the Lemon test, held that the Establishment Clause does not prevent a school district from providing aid to
individuals from a neutral government program even if the individual
enrolls in a sectarian school.' The Court reasoned that any benefits
the religious institution received were attributable to the private choices
of individuals." The Court distinguished Zobrest from Ball by first
stating that "the Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to the
placing of a public employee in a sectarian school." The Court then
found that nothing in the record, nor any necessary assumption to the
contrary, suggested the state-funded sign language interpreter would
add or subtract religion while fulfilling her duties."
The perceived turn in the course of this area of law came in Board of
Education v. Grumet," when five Supreme Court Justices opined that
the decision in Aguilar had incorrectly insisted New York disfavor
religion and that the Court should be prepared to bring Establishment
Clause jurisprudence back to government impartiality, not animosity,
towards religion.'7 In Grumet the New York Legislature passed a
statute providing that the Village of Kiryas Joel, a town inhabited solely
by members of the Satmar Hasidic sect of Judaism, constituted a
separate school district. The statute was passed in response to the needs
of the handicapped children of Kiryas Joel who had lost access to special

58. Id. at 489.
59. Id. at 486-87.
60. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
61. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-87 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
62. 509 U.S. at 13-14.
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Id.
66. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
67. Id. at 717-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Court should be prepared
to reconsider Aguilar). Justice Kennedy also concurred in the judgment, stating, "[T]he
decisions in Grand Rapids and Aguilar may have been erroneous." 512 U.S. at 731
(Kennedy, J., concurring). The dissent, written by Justice Scalia, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined, stated that Aguilar should be overruled at "the
earliest opportunity." 512 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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education services as a result of the decision in Aguilar." The Court
held that the statute violated the Establishment Clause by failing the
test of neutrality." However, the reasoning of Aguilar was specifically
criticized.70
III. COURT'S RATIONALE
When petitioners in Agostini filed their Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief
from the injunction imposed in Aguilar, they pointed to three changes
in the factual and legal landscape to justify their claim for relief.
Petitioners first contended that the exorbitant costs of complying with
the injunction constituted a significant factual development warranting
relief. They also pointed to the Justices' opinions in Grumet that
expressed views that Aguilar should be reconsidered or overruled.7
Finally, petitioners argued that the Establishment Clause decisions of
the Court since Aguilar were significant legal developments. The Court
quickly dismissed the costs issue as a factual change by pointing to the
Aguilar decision in which the obvious additional costs were predicted.72
The Court found that the ultimate accuracy of the predictions of a
drawback to the decision does not warrant relief from the decision."
Also, the statements made by the five Justices in Grumet were not
7 4 With the
considered a significant legal change warranting relief.
propriety of Aguilar not a question before the Court in those opinions,
the opinions
were held not to effect a change in Establishment Clause
75
law.
However, the Court gave more consideration to whether its subsequent
decisions as to Establishment Clause cases had so undermined Aguilar
that it was no longer good law.76 The Court summarized its conclusion
in Aguilar as resting on four assumptions: (1) public employees who
work on the premises of a religious school are presumed to inculcate
religion in their work; (2) the presence of public employees on private
school campuses creates a symbolic union between church and state; (3)
any public aid that directly aids the educational function of religious
schools impermissibly finances religious indoctrination, even if the aid

68. 512 U.S. at 692-93.
69. Id. at 709.
70. See id. at 717-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 512 U.S. at 731 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); and 512 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

71, 117 S. Ct. at 2006 (citing Grumet, 512 U.S. 687).
72. Id.at 2007.
73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 2008.
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reaches schools as a consequence of private decision-making; and (4) the
program necessitated an excessive entanglement with religion because
public employees who teach on the premises of religious schools must be
closely monitored to ensure that they do not inculcate religion."
The Court first pointed to the decision in Zobrest to show that they
had abandoned the presumptions that public employees on sectarian
school campuses would inevitably inculcate religion in their teaching or
constitute an impermissible symbolic union. 78 The Court stated that
Zobrest created fresh law-that sign language interpreters have the
same opportunity to inject religion into the performance of their duties
as do Title I employees.79 Therefore, the Court disavowed the presumption that public employees would inject religion when on school grounds,
necessitating surveillance by the state."
As for the symbolic union presumption, because the interpreter was
allowed on the religious institutional campus, the restrictions imposed
by Aguilar on Title I services on parochial school campuses were no
longer good law."' The Court reasoned that if the only difference
between a constitutional program and an unconstitutional program was
the location of the classroom, a line drawn based solely on location was
neither sensible nor sound. 2 The degree of cooperation between
private and public employees was the same in either case.' The Court
in Zobrest rejected location as a dispositive factor." Also, under
Zobrest, the Court concluded that there was no impermissible financing
of religious indoctrination in New York City's Title I program by
comparing its services to the provision of sign language interpreters
under IDEA. 5 Because both programs made aid available only to
eligible students, regardless of what school they attended, and because
the provided services supplemented the regular curricula, the Court
concluded that these services did not "'reliev[e ] sectarian schools of costs
"s The
they otherwise would have borne in educating their students. ' M
fact that Title I services are provided to several students at once,

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 2008-09.
Id. at 2010 (citing Zobrest, 509 U.S. 1).
Id. at 2011.
Id. at 2012.

Id.
Id.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2013 (alteration in original) (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12).
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compared with a single-student under IDEA, was held constitutionally
insignificant.8 7
In Agostini the Court pointed out the three grounds used to find an
excessive entanglement of church and state in Aguilar: (1) the program
required pervasive monitoring to ensure no inculcating of religion; (2)
the program required administrative cooperation between the Board and
parochial schools; and (3) the program might increase the dangers of
political divisiveness.'
The Court held the last two considerations
insufficient by themselves to create an excessive entanglement because
they are present no matter where and when services are provided to
students attending religious schools." The Court held the first ground
moot because there was no longer the presumption that a publicly
employed teacher on private school grounds would inculcate religion
while providing federally funded services." Without this presumption,
the need for the pervasive monitoring to prevent or detect any religious
injection into the teachings disappeared." The excessive entanglement
dissolves with the requirement of the pervasive monitoring." Thus, the
Court held New York City's Title I program did not violate the Establishment Clause and ordered the injunction vacated."3
Four Justices dissented in Agoatini, with Justice Souter writing on the
substantive law of the case." The dissent pointed out that the majority
relied solely on Zobrest to support its conclusion that the Court had
abandoned the presumption that the provision of services by public
employees on religious school grounds results in an impermissible effect
of state sponsoring of religion or a symbolic union between church and
state. 05
The dissent distinguished Zobrest based on the difference between a
teacher and a sign language interpreter." The dissent likened the
interpreter to a hearing aid or a book, either incapable of injecting
religion or at least having an ascertainable content; this view is
diametrically opposed to the majority's interpretation of the interpreter's

87. Id.
88. Id. at 2015.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2015-16.
91. Id. at 2016.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2019.
94. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsberg wrote her dissent on procedural
grounds. 117 S. Ct. at 2026 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2022-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2023.
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job.9 7 The dissent contended that a teacher's handling of a subject was
unascertainable and had the potential to inculcate religion.98
Next, the dissent distinguished the situation in Zobrest, which
concerned a single beneficiary, from New York City's Title I program
with twenty-two thousand beneficiaries." Instead of providing services
the school would not have otherwise furnished, the dissent concluded
that Title I services necessarily relieved a religious school of a necessary
expense that it would have otherwise assumed."3 The dissent, in
direct conflict with the majority opinion, 1 found the level of participation a constitutionally relevant factor. 2
Finally, the dissent distinguished Zobrest and the IDEA program from
the Title I program. 103 In Zobrest the individual student applied
directly for the funds."°4 As for Title I, the program may not be
applied for directly by the eligible students.'0 5
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The legal implications of the Supreme Court decision in Agostini for
Establishment Clause law are significant for a number of reasons. In
scrutinizing state programs whose funds ultimately subsidize religious,
private schools, the Court has abandoned a long held assumption about
publicly funded teachers instructing on private school campuses and has
replaced the emphasis on separation with an emphasis on neutrality.
These changes are a major break in the traditional wall between church
and state.
InAgostini the majority stated its intention not to abandon the Lemon
test, only to change the criteria for assessing whether aid to religion has
an impermissible effect. 0 6 The majority stated that the Court in
Zobrest created fresh law by abandoning the presumption that the
placement of public school employees on parochial school campuses
inevitably resulted in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored
indoctrination or constituted a symbolic union between government and
religion.0 7 Using the decision in Zobrest, which involved one publicly

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2024.
Id.
Id. at 2024 n.2.
Id. at 2013.
Id. at 2024.

104. Id
105. Id. at 2025.

106. 117 S. Ct. at 2009.
107. Id. at 2010.
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funded interpreter to follow one hearing-impaired student at a religious
institution, to expand the available funds for hundreds of teachers to
instruct thousands of children in New York is a large step by the
numbers alone. Words such as "indoctrination" and "symbolic union"
have the connotation of a large scale that was not present in the facts
of Zobrest. The perceived symbolic union between sign language
interpreters and religious schools is minuscule in the need and frequency
of governmental funds. In addition, the nature of a sign language
interpreter's job and lack of control over the surroundings makes any
perception of indoctrination far-fetched.
However, considering not only the large numbers involved in the Title
I program for remedial instruction but also the level of control that
teachers and guidance counselors will now have makes the perceptions
of indoctrination and symbolic union more understandable. Not only did
the decision in Agostini abandon the assumption that publicly funded
teachers on parochial school campuses might inculcate their instruction
with religion, but the decision also removed any requirements for state
monitoring to police this potential inculcation." s The symbolic union
between government and religion seems stronger when there are no
inspections required to ensure only secular instruction."°
The next issue likely to be affected by the decision in Agostini is
private school voucher programs. Most private school voucher programs
involve state funds paying for the education of children in private
schools, including religious schools."' With the Court's new emphasis
on neutrality, the idea of vouchers given to individual children, not
religious institutions, who then make a private, individual decision to
use the funds for parochial school education, seems to meet the neutral
1
standard."
The Court stated in Agostini that grants to individuals
who chose to use them for religious education were no more a violation
of the Establishment Clause than a state issuing a government employee
a paycheck knowing the employee plans to donate part or all of it to a
religious institution. 2 In the school voucher program, if individuals
are given the vouchers to go to any private school of their choice, the

108. Id. at 2016.
109. See Allan G. Osborne & Charles J. Russo, The Ghoul Is Dead, Long Live the
Ghoul: Agostini v. Feltonand the Delivery of Title I Services in Nonpublic Schools, 119 ED.
LAW REP. 781 (1997).
110. Jo Ann Bodemer, School Choice Through Vouchers:DrawingConstitutionalLemon.
Aid From the Lemon Test, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273 (1996).
111. See Arval A. Morris, PublicEducationalServices inReligious Schools: An Opening
Wedge for Vouchers? 122 ED. LAW REP. 545 (1998).
112. 117 S. Ct. at 2011.
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Court's requirement of "independent and private choices of individuals"
is satisfied."
In addition, the state funds do not finance religion because the
institution is receiving no more funding than it would if the student paid
the tuition from his own pocket. Even if it is shown that the religious
schools have a higher enrollment because of the vouchers, the religious
school has no extra funds for its religious activities because the program
only pays for the additional costs of the state-required secular instruction for each child with a voucher. Therefore, there is no financing of
religion, directly or indirectly.
Under the Court decisions in Aguilar and Ball, school vouchers would
most likely have fallen into the category of a "'direct and substantial
advancement of the sectarian enterprise.'" 4 Placing children in
classrooms provides the religious school with exactly what is necessary
for it to fulfill its mission of educating children in a religious environment.
Even though Agostini may be a major leap away from an emphasis on
the separation of church and state and toward an emphasis on neutrality, the majority carried this case by the slimmest of margins, five to
four."5 The change of only one Justice could take Establishment
Clause law back to an emphasis on separation.
MICHAEL

N. WHITE

113. Id. at 2012.
114. Ball, 473 U.S. at 393 (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977)).
115. 117 S. Ct. at 2003.

